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Abstract: This paper presents an agent-based micro-policy simulation model assessing public R&D policy ef-
fect when R&D and non-R&D performing companies are locatedwithin a network. We set out by illustrating the
behavioural structure and the computational logic of the proposed model; then, we provide a simulation ex-
periment where the pattern of the total level of R&D activated by a fixed amount of public support is analysed
as function of companies’ network topology. More specifically, the suggested simulation experiment shows
that a larger “hubness” of the network is more likely accompanied with a decreasingmedian of the aggregated
total R&D performance of the system. Since the aggregated firm idiosyncratic R&D (i.e., the part of total R&D
independent of spillovers) is slightly increasing, we conclude that positive cross-firm spillover eects – in the
presence of a given amount of support – have a sizeable impact within less centralized networks, where fewer
hubs emerge. This may question the commonwisdom suggesting that larger R&D externality eects should be
more likely to arise when few central champions receive a support.
Keywords: R&D Policy, Networks, Complexity, Social Simulation
Introduction
1.1 This paper presents an agent-based simulation model (ABM) for assessing the eect of public Research & De-
velopment (R&D) policy on companies’ R&D activity. It is a pure computationalmodel exploring the interaction
between a public agency, entitled tomanage a direct (or grant-based) R&D policy, and a given set of companies
eligible for receiving a monetary support to increase their actual level of R&D activity.
1.2 By running this model under dierent parametrization, we depict various policy scenarios under alternative
policies aimed at fostering the R&D activity of companies undergoing a given public R&D support. The model
assumes that agents (the public agency and the companies) maximize an objective function under reasonable
constraints, and that companies doing R&D operate within a network where possible externality eects can
arise.
1.3 Toour knowledge, nopreviousmodels of this type have beenproposed in the literature so far. Therefore, it con-
stitutes a first attempt to explore – by means of an agent-based simulation – R&D policy eects within specific
network topologies.
1.4 According to a large body of theoretical literature, corporate R&D activities need to be subsidized. The main
reason for this hinges on the many “imperfections” of the R&D market, which may lead to a poor R&D perfor-
mance on thepart of private companies. Themain sources of this distortive phenomenonhas been found in the
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“public good” nature of knowledge (i.e., low appropriability of R&D outcomes), as well as in the imperfections
in the markets for financing of R&D, due to strong asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders for
such a special good.
1.5 While there is common agreement on the fact that R&D should be publicly subsidized, no suicient attention
has been devoted so far to the mechanisms underlying the subsidization process, and to the eect of public
intervention on the whole R&D outcome (either at national or regional level).
1.6 The total R&D eect of a public R&D subsidization policy depends on various elements. However, three seem
particularly relevant to single out: (i) the interrelation between the behaviour of the funding public agency and
behaviour of profit-seeking supported (and not supported) companies; (ii) the R&D externalities generated by
the interaction among companies, which are embedded in an interconnected system, which can be described
through anetwork structure; (iii) themarket structurewithinwhich companies operate, as thedegree ofmarket
power–either in the technology (i.e., patents)or in theproductmarket –can influencecompanies strategiesand
incentives of doing R&D, thus ultimately aecting system R&D performance (for more detail, see the so-called
patent-race literature; e.g., see Dasgupta & Stiglitz 1980; Dasgupta 1988; d’Aspremont & Jacquemin 1988).
1.7 The present paper abstracts from point (iii), while emphasizing the consequences of point (i) and (ii) on the
dynamic of the total level of system R&D induced by public subsidization. It means that we consider only a
market for R&D (i.e., partial-equilibrium), with companies operating in perfect competition and assuming as
given both the patent and product market.
1.8 We set a welfare maximizing public agency choosing optimally the allocation of a given amount of subsidies,
and a set of companies choosing their optimal level of R&D bymaximizing a profit function over R&D.
1.9 At the heart of our model, there are the R&D spillover eects generated by the network structure within which
companies are embedded and operate. This brings to distinguish between an “idiosyncratic company R&D”
and a “total company R&D”, where the latter is given by the sum of the former plus the spillover eect (i.e., the
additional R&D coming from companies’ R&D links with other companies).
1.10 Our model is well suited for an in-depth understanding of how dierent companies’ network topologies can
have a dierential eect on total system R&D, measured as the sum of total companies’ R&D.
1.11 In this specific use of themodel, we are interested in assessing the eect of an increasing network “hubness” on
total system R&D performance. To this end, two versions of themodel are simulated and compared: one show-
ing the pattern of system R&D as function of an increasing hubness in the absence of spillovers; one showing
the pattern of system R&D as function of an increasing hubness in the presence of spillovers. Solved computa-
tionally, the model explores such patterns by a Monte Carlo integration over all model’s parameters. This was
to “neutralize” the eect of specific parameter choices.
1.12 Why should this experiment be interesting, and what policy implications might it have? Fundamentally, com-
paring the R&D behaviour of an R&D system with subsidization under an increasing network hubness (starting
from a random network as reference point), sheds light on the relative advantages/disadvantages to subsidize
a decentralized system compared to a more centralized one. This is a long-standing research question, which
still continues to rise challenging disputes among scientists and policy-makers. This paper contributes to such
debate, and oers its own perspective and understanding on the phenomenon.
1.13 Thepaper is organizedas follows: we first briefly review the literatureon the rationale for R&Dsubsidizationand
present some relatedworksusing, as inour case, a simulationapproach; in a subsequent sectionwepresent the
structure of our model in terms of agency and firms behavioural assumptions, as well as a description of how
wemodel the R&D spillover eect in this context; a separate section is devoted to an explanation of the logical
functioning of our model when embedded in a path-diagram perspective; then a specific section provides the
main simulation results we obtain from running several times themodel, while a final section closes the paper.
Finally, the Appendices placed at the end provide a pseudo-code for the Matlab program used for performing
our simulations (Appendix A), and a pseudo-code for generating networks with increasing hubness (Appendix
B).
Related Literature
2.1 Weorganize the literature review in twosubsections, onedealingwithpreviousattempts tomodelbusinessR&D
subsidization within ABMs; the other focusing on network topology and its relation with knowledge diusion
performance. Both aspects are at the heart of the structure and functioning of our proposedmodel.
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Modelling R&D subsidization
2.2 The economic rationale for subsidizing corporate R&D is based on the idea that R&D activity owns some intrin-
sic characteristics that substantially dierentiate it from other usual business activities. Jou & Lee (2001), for
example, suggest that R&D is dierent fromother private activities for threemajor reasons: (i) future rewards to
R&D are extremely risky and uncertain, (ii) R&D spending takes the form of an irreversible choice (i.e., it gener-
ates hard sunk costs), (iii) R&D activities produce positive externalities. Within the literature, R&D subsidization
was invoked for this third reason, as accounted by the Arrow (1962) pioneering paper. The argument goes like
this: since R&D activities have classical “public good” characteristics, the level of private R&D outlay would be
systematically lower than the socially optimal level. This occurs since the benefits associated to R&D activities
are easily and freely available to subjects that are not engaged in R&D eorts. As a consequence, the lack of
full appropriability of R&D returns reduces the incentive to invest in knowledge on the part of private for-profit
firms and thus government intervention ismeant as an eectiveway to reduce the extent of thismarket failure.
2.3 Only recently characteristics (i) and (ii) have been more seriously taken into account for justifying public inter-
vention. In her extensive survey on the subject, Hall (2002) recognizes that, unlike externalities, other market
failures associated to R&Dactivities canbe relevant. For instance, when capitalmarkets are imperfect, high-risk
investments can severely suer from credit rationing as the immaterial nature of R&D assets is unable to pro-
vide suitable collaterals to financers. In this case the asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers
of R&D assets could be extremely high, thus generating higher rationing of funds.
2.4 This problem is even more straighten in the presence of financially constrained firms and undersized venture
capital markets. The presence of high barriers to enter and exit the market is another potential source of pri-
vate R&D shortage: on the one hand, when a great amount of irreversible R&D investment have been done by
an incumbent firm, exiting the market could be seriously costly; on the other hand, entering the market could
be diicult too as the R&D performed by incumbent firms (as well as their related patenting activity) may gen-
eratemarket power, thus weakening free access and competition from external companies (Dasgupta & Stiglitz
1980; Dasgupta 1988; d’Aspremont & Jacquemin 1988). Othermotives suggesting the need for R&D support are
based on the potential lack of technological infrastructures and bridging institutions, on coordination failure of
profitable R&D joint ventures and on an excessive competitive arena leading to duplications in R&D eorts and
other wastes of R&D-related resources (Mowery 1995; Metcalfe 1995; Malerba 1993; Martin & Scott 2000).
2.5 As for previous literature on the subject, papers using a simulation approach for studying the eect of public
subsidies on corporate R&D are few, and generally they do not model directly the public agency objective and
behaviour. Atmicro-level papers of this kind are those by Jou& Lee (2001) and Laincz (2009). The latter embeds
the R&D subsidization within a dynamic programming general equilibrium setting à la Ericson & Pakes (1995).
The author builds a model with forward-looking dynamically optimizing firms where entry and exit decisions
determine the dynamic of market structure. R&D subsidies are external interventions raising long-run growth
rate and industry concentration as incumbent firms benefitmore from them. Nevertheless, the funding-agency
behaviour is not explicitly modelled and the R&D subsidy is just viewed as an external injection.
2.6 Atmacro-level, Bental & Peled (2002) provide a calibrated dynamicmodel of growth in the spirit of endogenous
growth models. They estimate the separate eect of restricted and unrestricted R&D subsidies on output and
total factor productivity (TFP) growth, showing that both types of subsidies have significant long-run impact on
aggregate performance. Yet, as in the case of Laincz (2009), no funding-agency decision process is represented
in the model.
2.7 The only two papers found in the literature explicitly modelling the firm-agency subsidization relationship is
that by Materia & Esposti (2006) and the one by Cerulli (2012). The paper by Materia & Esposti (2006) is pri-
marily interested in analysing the optimal agency co-financing rate. Two important elements characterize this
work: (i) it is essentially static as agency and firms maximize instantaneous objective functions, and (ii) it is
fully deterministic. Our model, on the contrary, assumes agency’s optimizing behaviour by also following a
specific representation of the corporate R&D determination, the one proposed by Howe & McFetridge (1976).
Furthermore our model is stochastic, and pays specific attention to welfare consequences of R&D externalities
generated by companies’ network topology.
2.8 Using a simulated funding-agency/supported-firm stochastic dynamic game, the paper by Cerulli (2012) shows
that the level of the subsidy provided by a funding (public) agency, normally used to correct for firm R&D short-
age, might be severely underprovided. This is due to the “externalities” generated by the agency-firm strategic
relationship, as showedby comparing twoversionsof themodel: oneassuming “rival” behaviors betweencom-
panies and agency (i.e., the current setting), and one associated to the “cooperative” strategy (i.e. the optimal
Pareto-eicient benchmark). The paper looks also at what “welfare” implications are associated to dierent
degrees of persistency in the funding eect on corporate R&D. Three main conclusions are thus drawn: (i) the
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relative quota of the subsidy to R&D is undersized in the rival compared to the cooperativemodel; (ii) the rivalry
strategy generates distortions that favor the agency compared to firms; (iii) whenpassing from less persistent to
more persistent R&D additionality/crowding-out eect, the lower the distortion the greater the variance is and
vice versa. As for themanagement of R&D funding policies, the paper concludes that all the elements favouring
greater collaboration between agency and firm objectivesmay help current R&D support to approach its social
optimum.
2.9 Although previous works tried tomodel policy settings where the funding agency and supported firms are het-
erogeneous interplaying agents, theydonotprovide specific attention to the role playedbyR&Dand innovation
networks whose formation, development and topology can play a relevant role in driving policy eects. An ex-
ception is represented by the SKINmodel proposed by Gilbert et al. (2001) to simulate knowledge dynamics in
innovationnetworks. SKIN is amulti-agentmodel (where agents are firms, policy actors, research labs, etc.) de-
scribing how innovations arise fromwould-be “artefacts” proposed on the part of competing companies. Such
artefacts can be improved on their own, or through the search of partners bringing additional knowledge. Each
agent is characterized by a “kene” (Gilbert et al. 2014)which is the central concept of the SKINmodel, defined as
a triplet of values representing: firm capability (C) in a scientific, technological, or business domain; firm ability
(A) to apply a certain capability to a particular field; and firm expertise (E) acquired with respect to that abil-
ity. Would-be innovation is derived from a subset of the firm’s kene triplets, and cooperative interaction with
partners allows firms to adjust their kene by changing expertise levels, and by adding or dropping abilities or
capabilities, thus reproducing various kinds of organisational learning processes. The authors show that – by
adopting specific parametrizations – their model is able to replicate qualitatively features of some typical real
innovation networks.
2.10 Recently, Ahrweiler et al. (2015) have proposed a development of the SKIN model (called INFSO-SKIN), which
provides ex-ante evaluation of possible R&D funding programmes. Using data on the European Commission’s
Framework 7 (FP7) programme, their model is calibrated to reproduce the funding strategies adopted by the
Commission agencies, the behaviour of funded organisations and projects, and the consequential formation of
network structures. Using as benchmark a baseline scenario, authors test a series of “what if” propositions, in
order to compare alternative scenarios emerging when various policy changes are considered. The emerging
properties of the networks and other results are then commented and evaluated in the light of the benchmark
scenario.
2.11 The approach followed by SKIN and its policy-oriented developments is probably the closest to our approach.
However, our modelling considers a more structural design than SKIN does, with agents’ objective functions
having awell-definedmathematical form. Furthermore, the research question of our experiment is dierent, in
that we are interested in assessing the response of the total system R&Dwhen the same policy is implemented
within dierent R&Dnetwork structures. Therefore, the network is – in our setting – exogenous andnot endoge-
nous (i.e., a product of agents’ behaviours) as in the SKIN’s case. Thismight appear a limitationof our approach,
but it is suitable if we are interested in a dierent kind of scenario evaluation, one in which the ultimate eect
is evaluated based on both company idiosyncratic R&D behaviour, and R&D spillovers due to an existing net-
work topology. Thus, we aremainly interested in answering questions like: “What network topologymaximizes
the total R&D response of the system under analysis when of a given policy (with a given amount of allocated
money) is implemented?”.
Network topology and knowledge diusion performance
2.12 Small-world properties, namely short distances and high clustering (Watts & Strogatz 1998), are recognized to
be crucial to enhance diusion processes in networks. In the field of interorganizational and interfirmnetworks
it is underlined as the small-worldmodel represents an optimal infrastructure for the creation and the diusion
of knowledge and innovation (Cowan 2005; Cowan & Jonard 2004; Schilling & Phelps 2007; Choi et al. 2010).
Generally speaking, knowledge is created collectively in local communities or clusters of organizations and eas-
ily spreads throughout the network thanks to the reduced distances.
2.13 Beside the importanceof small-worldproperties for theperformanceof knowledgediusion, the role playedby
scale-free architectures have been underlined as well. Hanaki et al. (2010) studied R&D collaborations in the IT
industry between 1985 and 1995, finding that the network becamemore andmore unbalanced during the years
due to a preferential attachment mechanism which led to the emergence of hub nodes. Carayol & Roux (2005)
developed a model of collective innovation ruled by a preferential attachment mechanism and demonstrated
that it leads to stable networks with small-world properties.
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2.14 On the other side, dierent evidence is presented by Fleming et al. (2007) who focused on patent coauthorship
to investigate the innovative performance of regional collaboration networks. Their findings point out that the
small-world structure does not improve innovative productivity among regions.
2.15 However, the investigation of knowledge diusion performance in networks characterized by scale-free prop-
erties or by amore generic “hubness” should be deepened for dierent reasons. At a theoretical level, it is plain
that diusion processes can be widely facilitated by the presence of few hubs which can quickly connect the
other nodes of the network. Here, the emphasis is on the easy navigability and searchability of scale-free net-
works (Lewis 2009; Newman2010): starting at a randomnode –whichwill likely be anodewith few connections
in a power-lawdegree distribution – it will be easy to find the shortest path to any other node by knowingwhere
the hubs are. Translated into knowledge diusion processes, itmeans that hubs are able to grant a quick access
to the knowledge exchanged in the network also to peripheral nodes.
2.16 Shiing to the field of inter-firms networks, some studies point out that a scale-free network can provide an
optimal infrastructure for the growth and diusion of innovative knowledge. Gay & Dousset (2005) show that
the R&D inter-organizational network in the antibody field of biotechnology industry is power-law shaped and
evolves according to a fitter-get-richer mechanism, an adaptation of the rich-get-richer mechanism proposed
by Barabási & Albert (1999). According to the latter, while older nodes have a greater chance to obtain links
from newcomers, the former states that firmswith the best fit to a relevant attribute have also a greater chance
of creating new links; in the case of Gay and Dousset’s study, firms with cutting-edge technology are the “fit-
ter” ones. Coherently with the literature on innovation and R&D networks discussed above, the antibody R&D
network also shows small-world properties, that is, short distances and high clusterization.
2.17 Lin & Li (2010) apply a simple model of knowledge innovation and diusion process to dierent types of net-
work models: regular, random, small-world and scale-free, and study the performance of knowledge transfer
in three directions: (i) the growth and diusion of knowledge, (ii) the adequacy of knowledge transfer, and (iii)
the spatial distribution of knowledge. The results they found show that the scale-free network provides an opti-
mal infrastructure for knowledge growth and diusion compared to the other topologies investigated. Further,
the knowledge variance – that is, the level of overall dierence in knowledge stock – is larger in the case of the
regular network and more balanced when the diusion process is applied to the scale-free and the random
topologies.
2.18 Finally, even the spatial dimension of knowledge diusion is less discriminatory in the case of a scale-free net-
work. Indeed, contrarily to the other models, a scale-free network allows for a higher dissemination of knowl-
edge in space, – i.e. regular, random, and, to a lesser extent, small-worldmodels – where it is more likely to ob-
serve knowledge segregation in clusters. The performance of scale-free networks in granting a large and even
distribution of knowledge is attributed to the presence of the long-range connections held by the hub-nodes
which, according to simulation results, provide the best infrastructure for the growth of innovative knowledge
and for a non-discriminatory distribution among the nodes. Small-world topologies are characterized by some
long-range links too, but to a lesser extent compared to the scale-free ones, leading to a more limited per-
formance. Worst performances can be observed in random and regular networks, which are characterized by
short-range connections andmuchmore even degree distributions.
2.19 Lastly, it has been recognized as many real-world R&D networks, particularly in the case of publicly subsidized
R&D, are characterized by power-law or other kinds of right-skewed distributions (Roediger-Schluga & Barber
2008; Protogerou et al. 2010, 2013; Barber et al. 2006, 2009; Breschi & Cusmano 2004; Almendral et al. 2007).
Such studies are coherent with the contributions by Newman (2005) and Clauset et al. (2009), according to
which purely scale-free shaped networks are hard to be found in the real world, despite networks withmore or
less unbalanced degree distributions – such as the power-lawwith exponential cut-o – are common in natural
and social sciences.
2.20 The arguments discussed above lead to the need of a deeper investigation of knowledge diusion performance
in the presence of an external subsidization of R&D activity with firms embedded in networks with a more or
less pronounced hubness. This is where the presence of highly connected nodes is a matter of degree instead
of an on/o state. Therefore, emerging regularities from a simulationmodel linking agents’ behaviors, network
topology (i.e., degree of hubness), and R&D performance seem interesting to analyze. This is themain objective
of the model proposed in this paper, that we describe in the next sections.
Modelling Approach and Methodology
3.1 In this section, we present our agent-based simulation model. The agents constituting the model are: a public
agency, which provides public funds to support private R&D companies, and a set of eligible-for-fund private
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companies. Companies are then assumed to be located within a network which can generate possible R&D
externality eects.
3.2 Both types of agents take decisions by maximizing an objective function under reasonable constraints. The
model runs under a series of assumptions which are illustrated below.
Companies’ behaviour: the optimal R&D expenditure
3.3 Companies choose the level of R&D expenditure (R) which maximizes their profits. Thus, the optimalR is the
one equalizing the (expected) marginal rate of return and the (expected) marginal capital cost of doing R&D.
The optimal level of R&D is in turn a function of the R&D support (S) that a firm may potentially receive from
the public agency.
3.4 We assume that each company owns an optimal level of the subsidy, thusmaking the R&D optimal equation as
a convex function of the public support (a parabola, for instance). This is the most relevant assumption of our
model, as it identifies the agency’s optimization problem as embedded in a convex system, thus assuring exis-
tence and uniqueness of the solution. There is nonetheless sound empirical evidence suggesting that such as-
sumption is reliable. Econometric studiesonR&Dsupport using “continuous treatment”, for instance, showthat
the eect of public R&D support on companies’ ownR&D tends to decreasewith higher level of support (Marino
& Parrotta 2010; Cerulli & Potì 2016). This means that, beyond a certain threshold, receiving additional amount
of subsidies seems to be detrimental instead of beneficial for company R&D activities. Two theories explain
this evidence. One is based on the so-called “investment adjustment costs” due to the search of new skilled
human resources, adaptation time, and organizational frictions which accompany new R&D investments, by
temporarily reduce R&D productivity. The second is embedded in the principal-agent (or asymmetric infor-
mation) theory, suggesting that larger amount of subsidies increase firms’ costs of opportunistic behaviours
as soaring project’s state costs versification due to larger monitoring (performed by the funding agency) can
take place. For both reasons, a company could be reluctant to demand additional monetary support, as new
costs could arise, thus reducing its incentive to perform additional R&D projects. This justifies a convex relation
between firm own R&D and amount of public support.
3.5 Finally, wealso assume that R&Dspillovers among firmsmay takeplace, due to companies’ relationshipswithin
their R&D network, where the R&D flows from one company to another according to the strength of the rela-
tionship between firms. Therefore, each company R&D includes both an idiosyncratic component (Ridio) and
an additional component due to the presence of R&D externalities. The sum of the two components provides
the total R&D outlay of a company (Rtotal).
3.6 Firms run in a competitive market where they sell a single research output at a parametric/normalized price
prd = 1. Each single company owns a profit function convex inRidio, where the production function is linear
and costs are increasing (Howe&McFetridge 1976; David et al. 2000; David&Hall 2000). The total companyR&D
revenues are:
φR2idio
where φ is a positive number. The total company R&D costs are:
h(S)Ridio + c
where h(S) is a proper function of the subsidy S received, and a is a scale factor. The company profit function
is thus defined as:
Π(S,Ridio) = φR
2
idio − [h(S)Ridio + c]
3.7 In order to maximize this function overRidio, we calculate the first order condition obtaining:
δΠ(S,Ridio)
δRidio
= 2φRidio − h(S) = 0
3.8 We hold that:
h(S) = aS − bS2 − (Z −K)
where a, b,Z andK are positive parameters. This equation implies that each company owns a desired level of
S, given the parameters. Given this setting, we finally obtain that:
Ridio(S) =
1
2φ
{
aS − bS2 − (Z −K)
}
= prdS − kS2 − (F −D)
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or, given that prd = 1:
Ridio(Si) = Si − kiS2i − Fi +Di
which represents the optimal “idiosyncratic” R&D expenditure of firm i as function of the level of the subsidy
received Si. The (positive) parameters F andD in the previous formula have the following interpretation: F
represents the fixed costs of performing R&D, implying that the higherF , the lower the level of the optimal R&D
the company would be willing to provide (other things being equal). A largeF could be however compensated
by a largeD, beingD defined as the “degree centrality” of each company within the network. This means that
high fixed costs can be compensated by amore central role of the company in the network, an assumption that
seems reasonable. Indeed, ceteris paribus, themore the firm is central in the network, themore its R&D should
be high; this accounts for the stylized fact that more central companies in R&D networks are also those with a
larger size of R&D expenditure.
3.9 Figure 1 illustrates the shape of company optimal R&D as a function of the subsidy S received from the pub-
lic agency. Although such a shape entails that companies own an optimal R&D subsidy, they however cannot
choose this level, as it is decidedby thepublic agency. As discussed above, it isworth to stress that such a shape
suggests that subsidies produce not only benefits for the firm, but also costs that, beyond a certain threshold,
can overcome benefits thus yielding a convex form of theR-S relationship.
Figure 1: Shape of the optimal R&D function as a function of the subsidy S.
3.10 Finally, since the network degree-centrality of the company strictly depends on network topology, it is conve-
nient to indicateD as a function of the networkM in which the company operates; we can thus re-write the last
formula as:
Ridio(Si) = Si − kiS2i − Fi +Di(M)
which makes it explicit thatD depends onM, the network matrix.
Agency behaviour: optimal subsidy provision
3.11 Given a constant total amount of subsidy equal to S¯, the direct objective of the public agency is that of finding
the optimal allocation of such amount by maximizing the total level of R&D (i.e., the sum of all companies’
idiosyncratic R&D spending) (Cerulli 2012; Laincz 2009; Jou & Lee 2001).
3.12 To this end, we first assume that the agency knows the company ability to performR&D and its centrality within
the network, but it has no knowledge of firms’ R&D network relationships. As objective, the agency wants to
determine two things: (i) which companies are worth to support and which are not (i.e., selection-process); (ii)
which share of S¯ has the agency to provide to each firm selected for support. Thus, the agency comes up with
two optimal solutions: (i) the N1 (out of N ) selected companies; (ii) the optimal allocation of the subsidy S¯
within theN1 selected companies.
3.13 The agency optimization problem is the following:
maxS1,S2,...,SNW (S1, S2, . . . , SN ) =
∑N
i=1Ridio(Si) =
∑N
i=1[Si − kiS2i − Fi +Di(M)]
s.t.∑N
i=1 Si ≤ S¯
Ridio(Si) ≥ Ridio(0) ∀i = 1, . . . , N ; Si ≥ 0
JASSS, 20(4) 4, 2017 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/20/4/4.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3494
3.14 Such a problem assumes that1:
• the total sum of subsidies is fixed and equal to S¯ (budget constraint);
• the expected firm R&D conditional on the subsidy is higher when a company is supported than when it is
not supported (incentive compatibility constrain);
• subsidies are positive numbers.
3.15 Observe that, in doing its choice, the public agency does not take into account network externalities, but only
the arguments of the idiosyncratic R&D.
3.16 Once the Agency has chosen the N1 units to support along with their level of support, all the N companies
perform their actual R&D expenditure, given the support received, that is, Rtotal,i. The global (system) policy
eect is finally given by:
Rˆtotal =
N∑
i=1
Rtotal,i
which is a function of network topological parameters, given any other idiosyncratic factor considered in the
model.
Total R&D outlay by introducing network externality
3.17 In order to calculate the total R&D expenditure, once the level of the idiosyncratic R&D is known, it is first nec-
essary to introduce the network within which companies operate.
3.18 Weassume the network to be represented by aweightingmatrixM = [mij ], wheremij ] represents the generic
element of this matrix. M can possibly contain either positive or negative values, thus accounting for positive
or negative externalities respectively. However, at this step of analysis, we only consider positive externalities
(i.e.,mij ≥ 0).
3.19 We define the total R&D outcome of company i as:
Rˆtotal,i = Ridio,i +
N∑
j=1
mijRidio,j with mij = 0 if i = j
where
∑N
j=1mij = 1, and N is the total number of companies forming the network. This implies that, for
the generic company i, its total R&D outlay is equal to its idiosyncratic R&D plus a weighted average of the
idiosyncratic R&D of other companies. It means that a company can increase its total R&D performance either
if the size of its relational weights is large, or if the number of its relational weights is large.
Simulating the eect of the policy under dierent network parameters
3.20 The model is characterized by the parametric space Θ which defines the entire set of parameters’ values un-
der which the model can be simulated. This set also contains the network parameters as distinct parameters
governing simulation results.
3.21 If we indicate by θ one single parameter characterizing a specific network topology, we can write:
M = M(θ)
Given this definition, wemay be interested in studying the pattern of the function:
Rˆtotal = Rˆtotal(θ|Θ−θ)
to see how the policy eect changes under dierent level of θ, given the value of all other parameters. The
meaning of θ depends on the specific network topology considered. Figure 2 presents an illustrative example
of the typical result we obtain in simulating our model this way.
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Figure 2: Total R&D policy eect as function of the network topology parameter θ.
3.22 Companies are located within an R&D network, and dierent network topologies can produce dierent policy
eects. The network impacts onRtotal in two ways: (i) the more a company is central in the network, the more
a lower barrier to do R&D is assumed (thus reducing the fixed costs of doing R&D); (ii) dierent network topolo-
gies could provide dierent R&D performance. Therefore, running simulations under dierent policy scenarios
provides guidance to detect the emerging properties of the R&D pattern under specific model’s parameteriza-
tions.
3.23 Ourmodel uses Monte Carlo integration to provide reliable conclusions about simulation results. In particular,
we are interested in answering question of this type: “Are specific configurations of the network more likely to
produce larger R&D eect than other types of settings?” In order to answer questions like this, we have run
our model in a number of dierent simulation settings. In this specific paper we are interested in identifying
whether, ceteris paribus, a quasi-random network is or is not more conducive to higher levels of R&D than net-
works characterized by the emergence of specific nodes playing as hubs. It may thus be interesting to assess
whether the policy eect on Rtotal will show an increasing or decreasing pattern as a function of network’s
“hubness”.
Figure 3: Path-diagram of model simulation.
3.24 Figure 3 illustrates the path-diagram of our model simulation. The timing of the process occurs along the fol-
lowing steps:
• The point of departure is the generation of a weighted network of firms (i.e., the matrixM) which deter-
mines company degree-centrality in the network and thus the value ofDi(M).
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• Given the value taken by other firms idiosyncratic parameters, the agency can operate by selecting the
companies to support, and then by optimally allocating the subsidy S¯ among them.
• Companies then provide their idiosyncratic R&D outlay, which depends on the subsidy received (Si), and
other idiosyncratic parameters.
• Subsequently, companies perform their total R&Dexpenditureby transmitting andby receivingR&Dspill-
overs according to the structure of the matrixM, which defines the network topology.
• Finally, we calculate the sum of total R&D expenditure over the entire population of companies, which is
the main outcome of interest.
3.25 Figure 4 sets out the model programming flow, which explains the computational steps through which the
model is simulated. This figure shows that we have three simulation layers, based on: (i) type of experiment,
(ii) given level of the network parameter(s), and (iii) run of the single simulation. To understand how this works,
consider the random network case: the type of experiment is “random network”, the parameter to fix is p (the
“edge probability”), and a single run generates one single network based on the fixed p, as well as a draw from
the distributions of all the idiosyncratic parameters needed to solve numerically themodel. As for the distribu-
tions fromwhich firm idiosyncratic parameters are drawn, Table 1 displaysmeaning and type of distribution (or
just the value) of each parameter.
3.26 In order to generate a “hubbish” graph (i.e., a network with a skewed degree distribution with few highly con-
nected nodes – i.e. the hubs – and several nodes with few ties), we developed a specific original algorithm
(whose pseudo-code is reported in Appendix B).
3.27 The most common algorithm for creating networks shaped around hubs is provided in the Barabási & Albert
(1999)model of preferential attachment, which allows for the generation of networkswith a degree distribution
decaying through a power law. This is shaped by the parametersm0 (the initial number of nodes) andm (the
nodes which add to the graph at each step), and creates ties by preferentially choosing the most connected
nodes.
3.28 Bymanipulating these parameters, it is however not possible to control for network hubness and network den-
sity independently, as density is defined by the ratio between 2m0 and the number of nodes, thus implying that
the degree of the most connected node scales as a logarithm of the former (Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005).
3.29 In this paper, we are interested in the spillover eects due to a variation in network hubness, assuming a con-
stant density of the network (while the scale-free properties can be neglected); as a consequence, a specific
algorithm for creating increasingly centralized networks has to be proposed. Such algorithm consists of the
following three steps (see Appendix B):
1. aG(N, p) Erdős-Rényi (1959) random network withN nodes and density p is first created;
2. some ties are then randomly de-wired;
3. de-wired ties are finally stochastically re-wired to higher degree nodes, so a graph topology centralized
around few hubs does emerge.
3.30 The random graph is created by establishing a reciprocated tie among each pair of nodes i and j with a proba-
bility defined by the parameter p; the higher its value the denser will be the graph; it is straightforward that, for
p = 0, the graph will be empty, while for p = 1 a full graph is obtained.
3.31 Each of the reciprocated tie thus created can be split into a tie going from j to i (or from i to j) which is main-
tained, while the tie going from i to j (or from j to i) is cleared and a new tie between i (or j) and a randomly
chosen node h is created. The split probability is modeled by a parameter d, where for d = 0 no reciprocated
ties will remain in the graph, and for d = 1 all ties will be kept as reciprocated.
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Figure 4: Model programming flow.
3.32 Once the random graph has been set, a detachment process randomly deletes the ties which will be prefer-
entially attached to the most connected nodes. Network’s centralization around the hubs is modeled by the
parameter r and the parameter deterministic (see the Matlab code in Appendix A). The number of ties to be de-
tached and subsequently rewired is modeled by the parameter r, which defines the portion ofN that will be
involved in the process; parameter deterministic rules the probability of re-wiring to themost connected node,
defined as the node with the highest total degree centrality2. The larger the value of this parameter, the higher
is the probability to re-wire a tie with the most connected node.
Parameters Meaning Distribution
prd Unit price of R&D Fixed to the value 1
ki Degree of the R&D concavity as function of S Uniform[0; 1]
Fi R&D fixed costs Uniform[0; 1]
Di(M) Firm degree-centrality in the network Firm degree-centrality in the network
mij Generic weight of the network matrixM Uniform[0,1] and normalized to get
∑
j mij = 1
Table 1: Distribution function of model parameters
Assessing theeectofR&Dpublic support on total R&Dby increasingnet-
work “hubness”
4.1 In this application of the model, we are interested in identifying whether, ceteris paribus, a random network is
or is not more conducive to higher levels of R&D than, for instance, networks characterized by the emergence
of specific nodes playing as hubs. We will look at whether the policy eect on Rtotal shows an increasing or
decreasing pattern as a function of an increasing “hubness” of the network.
4.2 We runa simulationby setting 100 companies, 5 runs, 334distinct values of thehubnessparameter, thusobtain-
ing a simulated dataset of 167,000 observations. Before presenting themain results of this study, it is important
to assess whether the algorithm proposed to generate networks with increasing hubness works properly.
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Figure 5: Pattern of the clusterization index when the parameter of hubness increases. The clusterization index
is measured as the probability that two neighbours of a node are neighbours between them (calculated as an
average over fiy replications of the model).
4.3 Figure 5 shows the pattern of the network clusterization indexwhen the parameter of hubness increases. In this
case, the clusterization index ismeasured as the probability that two neighbours of a node are also neighbours
between them. As shown, there is a clear increasing relation between the hubness parameter (the increase in
the preferential attachment towards nodes with high current degree) and the clusterization. This means that
the algorithmwe have proposed to generate hubished networks work as expected.
Figure 6: Pattern of the average path length (APL) when the parameter of hubness increases. The APL index is
measured as the average shortest path between two nodes.
4.4 Similarly, Figure6displays thepatternof thenetworkaveragepath length (APL)when theparameter of hubness
increases. In this case, the APL index is measured as the average shortest path between two nodes. Again, we
see that the relation is an increasing one, thus confirming that our algorithm produces networks where it takes
longer steps to pass from one node to another, an eect due to higher clusterization.
4.5 Established thatour “network increasinghubness”algorithmdoes the right thing,wecangoonbyproviding the
main results of this study. To this end, we first calculate, for each value of the hubness parameter, the median
of the log ofRtotal, and then a regression of this variable on the parameter of hubness. The result is reported
in Table 2, while Figure 7 shows the fit graphically.
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Dependent variable: MedianRtotal
Hubness -.00026∗∗∗ (3.08e−06)
Beta coeicient -.199
Number of observations 166,999
F(1,166997) 6910.2
P-value of the F-test 0.0000
R-squared 0.0397
Table 2: Linear regression of themedian of the log ofRtotal on the hubness parameter. Note: Standard errors in
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.6 It is immediate to see that the larger the hubness of the network, the lower the optimal level of R&Dactivatedby
an amount of subsidy S¯ =10. Thebeta coeicient is around -20 and it is highly significant. Figure 7 confirms this
decreasing pattern, although it also emphasizes that the variability around the fit is rather huge, as confirmed
by the low R-squared of this regression.
4.7 If we look atRidio, the result is in the opposite sense, with a statistically significant (but moderate) increase of
Ridio as soon as the hubness increases (see Table 3). Figure 8 confirms this finding.
4.8 These results suggest that, in the presence of positive R&D spillovers, and for a fixed amount of support, the
median of the total population R&D tends to decrease as soon as few nodes become highly important in the
network. This was not a trivial regularity to find out without such analysis. On average, and just by consider-
ing the median as representative moment of the entire distribution of the log ofRtotal, one can conclude that
the policy R&D return to an investment equal to S¯ is higher in R&D networks characterized by lower hubness.
Observe, also, that this result is independent of the specific idiosyncratic parameters chosen, as what we per-
formed in this experiment is aMonte Carlo simulationwhich explores, by subsequent draws, the entire support
of the distribution of these parameters.
4.9 The fact that theRidio ismoderately increasingwith larger hubnessmaybeexplainedby the fact that fixed costs
of R&D decrease with a larger centrality-degree – i.e.D(M) – which is an argument of theRidio function.
4.10 Finally, Figure9 illustrates the trendof themedianof log(Rtotal), and thatof themedianof log(Ridio) as function
of the hubness within the same graph. As expected, in the presence of positive R&D spillovers, the overall level
of the median of log(Rtotal) is higher than that of log(Ridio).
Figure 7: Pattern of themedian of log ofRtotal as a function of the network hubness parameter. A fixed amount
of support is assumed.
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Dependent variable: MedianRidio
Hubness .0000178∗∗∗ (5.54e−06)
Beta coeicient .0078449
Number of observations 166,999
F(1,166997) 10.28
P-value of the F-test 0.0013
R-squared 0.0001
Table 3: Linear regression of the median of the log ofRidio on the hubness parameter. Note: Standard errors in
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Figure 8: Pattern of the median of log ofRidio as a function of the network hubness parameter. A fixed amount
of support is assumed.
Figure 9: Trend of themedian of log(Rtotal), and of the median of log(Ridio) as function of increasing network
hubness.
4.11 Another important finding concerns thepatternof the standarddeviationof log(S)as functionof theparameter
of hubness. We expect a decreasing standard deviation of the distribution of the R&D support as long as the
level of hubness increases. This should be so, as an increase in network hubness should reduce the number of
supported units to fewer companies. Table 4 shows in fact that this is the case: the beta regression coeicient
is negatively significant with a value equal to -0.073, which is however not very sizable. Figure 10 confirms this
finding although it also sets out a large variability around the linear fit.
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Dependent variable: Standard deviation of the log of S
Hubness -.0000625∗∗∗ (2.08e−06)
Beta coeicient -.073
Number of observations 166,999
F(1,166997) 906.01
P-value of the F-test 0.0000
R-squared 0.0054
Table 4: Linear regression of the standard deviation of the log of S on the hubness parameter. Note: Standard
errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.12 Also, the degree-centrality index increases – as expected – with the hubness, with a significant beta regression
coeicient of 0.073.
Figure 10: Linear pattern of the standard deviation of the log of S on the hubness parameter.
4.13 Finally, Figure 10 provides a plot of the relation between the (median) of total R&D spending and the (median)
centrality-degree by firm, when the parameter of hubness increases. We detect a decreasing pattern between
the two variables, which is informative to interpret previous results. Indeed, what such relation entails is that
– as soon as the network hubness increases – the overall network average degree reduces accordingly, thus
meaning that the nodes tend to become progressively less connected (on average) as consequence of a larger
concentration of ties in few nodes. This is detrimental for R&D flows circulation and total R&D turns out to drop
down. This is the main mechanism behind the scope of our findings. Table 5, lastly, shows regression results
that confirm the graphical ones.
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Figure 11: Relationbetween theTotal R&D spending andmediandegreeby firm,when theparameter of hubness
increases.
Dependent variable: Median total R&D spending
Median of degree-centrality -62.32∗∗∗ (3.06)
Beta coeicient -.0496
Number of observations 166,999
F(1,166997) 413.43
P-value of the F-test 0.0000
R-squared 0.0025
Table 5: Linear regression of the median total R&D spending and the median of the degree-centrality. Note:
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Conclusions
5.1 This paper has presented an agent-based micro-policy simulation for an assessment of public R&D policy ef-
fect on companies’ R&D activity. We have shown the behavioural properties and the computational logic of
this model, and then illustrated a simulative example where the total level of R&D activated by a fixed amount
of public support becomes function of companies’ network topology. More specifically, the simulation experi-
ment presented here shows that larger network “hubness” – on average – produces a decreasingmedian of the
aggregated total company R&D. Since the aggregated firm idiosyncratic R&D (the part of total R&D independent
of spillovers) is slightly increasing, we conclude that positive cross-firm spillover eects in the presence of a
given amount of support, have a larger impact in less centralized network where fewer hubs emerge. This may
question the commonwisdom, which suggests that larger R&D externality eects aremore likely to arise when
few “central” champions receive a support.
5.2 Some literature on knowledge diusion within networks seems however to support our findings. Many studies
have shown that in formal and informal social networks, skewed degree distribution is oen present, as few
nodes in the networks havemore connections than the average. The preferential attachment process explains
the presence of hubby networks (Barabási & Albert 1999), and are able to describe rather well the network
structure of environments where reputation and/or power is relevant (Gould 2002).
5.3 An outstanding systematic review of the literature on knowledge networks (Phelps et al. 2012), dealing with
inter-organizational studies and the eect of the whole network structure on network knowledge outcome,
reports that dense structures (like clusters) increase the rate and extent of information diusion, although they
reduce at the same time information diversity (Lazer & Friedman 2007). Excessive clusterization can reduce
organizational innovation by creating dysfunctional levels of social cohesion, and reducing the availability of
diverse information within clusters (Uzzi & Spiro 2005).
5.4 Schilling & Fang (2014) studied the role of hubness in organizational knowledge outcome of interpersonal net-
works, and find that moderately hubby networks outperformmore “open” and “democratic” networks. When
JASSS, 20(4) 4, 2017 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/20/4/4.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3494
organizations or individuals interact, they exchange and recombine information, resulting in new or refined
ideas (Argote 1999). In such view of the learning mechanism, a fast process of diusion, facilitated within a
clustered structure, can generate benefits to the innovation practice. At the same time, however, “when ideas
diuse too quickly through a population, the result can be a premature convergence around a popular though
suboptimal set of ideas” (Schilling & Fang 2014, p. 7). Some authors (Fang et al. 2010) have also found that orga-
nizations split into isolated subgroups – aswell as subgroups havingmany reciprocal links – generally foster the
diversity of ideas, by enhancing the learning outcome. Other aspects supporting our result dealwith the “inei-
ciency cost” of hubbynetworks due to theburdensome information theyhave to copewith, and thepresenceof
agency-type problems producing lack of completeness and accurateness of information circulation. Moreover,
a large body of research finds a U-shaped relationship between information quantity and managerial perfor-
mance (Eppler & Mengis 2004).
5.5 To sum up, the result of our experiment can be understood as follows: the propagation of an exogenous shock,
like a public financial support, to autonomous firms’ R&D expenditure decision provides a better welfare re-
turn when knowledge spillovers circulate within firms’ networks which are moderately clusterized and thus
less close around powerful industrial groups.
5.6 Thispaperpresents justoneofmanypossible simulationexperimentsonecouldperformusing this agent-based
model. Further experimentsmay include, for instance, anassessmentof anR&Dpolicy eectwhenother signifi-
cantnetworkparameters are changed, orwhenoneconsidersdierentnetwork topologies, suchas “scale-free”
or “small-world” networks. We plan to go into these directions in other applications of this model.
5.7 Finally, a further type of analysis the model can allow for exploring concerns the possibility of its calibration
using real data. Indeed, if an empirical measure of the actual network was available, so that an empirical cali-
bration of the model’s parameters would become possible, onemay also provide an assessment of the impact
of the R&D support policy on a real-study context. This way, it would be possible to use our model as a toolbox
for ex-ante evaluation of real R&D-promoting policies. This seems a challenging potential development of this
model, although its feasibility requires specialized datasets not easily available in real contexts of analysis.
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Appendix A
The (Matlab) codeof ourmodel entails, for eachexperiment, twodistinct loops: (i) a first loopvaries thenetwork
parameter of interest, which depends on the type of network chosen (for instance, in the case of a random
network, we consider as network parameter the network “density”); (ii) a second loop repeats the simulation
with a dierent set of companies and a dierent (generated) network.
Within each run, the code performs the following three sequential steps:
1. It calculates the optimal subsidy for each company by eliminating those companies with a value of the
optimal subsidy ending up out of the acceptable (to agency) range of values.
2. If no additional companies need to be eliminated, it calculates the amount of R&D obtained with the
previous optimal support, called in the codeRidio.
3. Finally, it calculates the amount of total R&D thus obtained by adding to Ridio the part of R&D coming
from the network eects (i.e., spillovers).
Figure 12 sets out the pseudo-code of our simulator.
Figure 12: Pseudo-code of our model simulation.
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Appendix B
7.1 This appendix provides the pseudo-code for generating networks with increasing hubness. The algorithm –
as described in the main text – starts with a random network and then generates a preferential attachment
procedure to nodes with higher degree-centrality. Figure 13 sets out in details the pseudo-code.
Figure 13: Pseudo-code for generating networks with increasing hubness.
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Notes
1This optimization problem is solved computationally using the gradient method, as a closed form of its
solution is not available.
2Total degree centrality is obtained by summing in-degree and out-degree values.
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